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Introduction 
The scope of psychopathology as a discipline and its 
ability to1 shape what is disturbed or normal and2 to be 
assessed in the mental state examination is central to 
Psychiatry. For more than a century the increase of cli-
nical workload, strict insurance policies and the request 
of objectivity and reliability for research have enforced 
categorization and operationalization of psychopathologi-
cal phenomena. This move has been blamed as having led 
psychopathology into a dead end, undermining research 
and clinical diagnosis1-5. 
The search for objectivity was spearheaded by the belief 
that standardization would (1) help increase its ever-low 
reliability6, (2) diminish the exposure of Psychiatry to 
scientific criticism1 and most of all (3) restore the repu-
tation of psychiatrists for they were reckoned as lacking 
scientific validity7. This effort however has failed to pro-
ve suitable and raised general negative reviews of the 
consequences of the setting, format and duration of the 
interviews8 as well leading to specific problems, inclu-
ding “procrustean errors”9, and “the looping effect”10. The 
worst-case scenario is that Psychiatry has dismissed the 
relational proxies of meaning (overlooking the conver-
sational structure of the inquiry) accepting checklists of 
symptoms as proxies of patient’s rapport even if perfor-
med by untrained interviews, in eerie settings (e.g. tele-
phone or email). These markdowns on the quality of the 
assessment were taken as “means to an end” in the search 
for a never reached reliability (e.g. DSM5). 
Whilst Psychopathology didn’t reach the expected relia-
bility, other phenomena resisted to operationalization and 
were basically removed from our interviews, as is the case 
of first and second person perspectives. So the very nature 
of phenomena psychopathology accesses and studies to-
day is distinct from that of the symbols inscribed in des-
criptive psychopathology (which included such experien-
tial tracks). Other ontological precepts, as relational and 
conversational features were discarded, sanctioning direct 
questions as equivalents of narratives to meaning. Cur-
rent assessment asks patients recognize externally given 
symbols and not to explore their experiential meanings 
weaving and collecting person-centred meanings. Also by 
keeping a fixed set of external symbols, psychopatholo-
gy might have become a rigid and obsolete system with 
no conceptual research3,4. All these congregate in a three 
dimension problem: (1) the reduction in the quantity and 
quality of symbols we are assessing, (2) the loss of first 
and second person perspective symbols, (3) the forfeiture 
of the particularity of meaning leading to a crystallization 
of psychopathological symbols (out-dated).
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Psychopathological enquire requires overwhelming and 
painful self-disclosure and so creating safe and receptive 
environments is fundamental to ease the willingness and 
depth of enquire. Rushed and superficial encounters can 
be misleading by providing deceptive negative accounts 
which, rather than no psychopathology, could indicate 
that the person is not willing to share his experiences. 
psychopathological phenomena are not segregated ex-
periences but a structure of elements (meaning and ex-
periences) which can only be seen together. Direct ques-
tioning or keeping interviews to a set of items (or to yes 
and no answers) causes the loss of narrative arrangement 
(structure) as well as a disturbance of personal meaning 
process and symbols3,11.
Present day assessment focuses only on signs and objecti-
ve symptoms as private subjective and inter-subjective ap-
praisals were dismissed as unreliable. Moreover signs and 
objective symptoms aspire to help the creation of reliable 
a-theoretical constellations of syndromes. Yet this hasn’t 
improved reliability. Yet it has restricted dialogical proper-
ties of the encounter. These include the process of giving 
meaning to experience (person) and translating experien-
ces (interpersonal) relies in a private process that is con-
tingent to linguistic and cultural background. The meaning 
of being mentally ill comprises psychopathological units 
many of which mental phenomena are pre-symbolic at time 
of complaint making it difficult to process and communi-
cate (e.g. subjective vague restlessness or inter-subjective 
clinical impression of diagnosis)12. Also those experiences 
require additionally subjective and intersubjective integra-
tion1,2,13-16, for instance, crying is not universally psychopa-
thological. The availability of such meaning relies on the 
interviewers ability to (1) facilitate the exploration of per-
sonal symbols; (2) detach themselves from prejudiced im-
ports from their personal experience/studies and (3) assess 
and clarify their own experiential features in the encounter.
This essay focuses on these dimensions believing in their 
critical role to increase the scope, magnitude and validity of 
psychopathological enquire. It advocates that Person-Cen-
tred Attitude (PCA) of the Person Centred Psychotherapy 
(PCP) is similar to the phenomenological and aesthetical 
attitudes. Yet contrarily to the latter, which are mainly theo-
retical undertakings problematic to demonstrate or to com-
municate, the PCA is predominantly a hands-on practical 
model. Therefore acquiring proficiency in such complex 
attitudes could rise from training PCA. These include the 
foundational stones of Person Centred Psychotherapy put 
forward by Carl Rogers (6 ontological principles) as well 
as its non-directive stance13. It is suggested that the PCA 
can improve the quality of psychopathological enquire by 
allowing (1) enhanced relational features, (2) an ontologi-
cal framework which details and preserves phenomena in-
cluding (3) subjective and inter-subjective experiences and 
meanings.
Known links between PCP and Psychopathology 
A contempt for descriptive psychopathology (and no-
sology)
A notorious relation between PCP and descriptive psycho-
pathology is of contempt for their positions in assessment 
and diagnosis. PCP does not endorse psycho-diagnosis or 
any predetermined symbols to patients’ experiences and 
meanings. PCA foundational structure takes experiences 
and meanings to be person centred in that no external 
symbols could help framing the phenomenon that is being 
described. There are therefore no phenomenological ma-
rks or epistemological pathways aprioristically recogni-
zable. If we take descriptive psychopathology as a list of 
symbols that portray psychopathological phenomena re-
presentative in mental disorder its easy to understand the 
antimony of PCP. However, the original agenda (of the 
eidetic reduction of the symbols that today characterize 
descriptive psychopathology) entailed an attitude and me-
thod that shares many features with the PCA. The “pheno-
menological method” characterized by “epoché” as well 
as other contributions is discussed in the next section. 
Another elucidation is that no matter how unsullied the 
PCA might look, PCP therapists can (and should) learn 
the various epistemologies, specially descriptive psycho-
pathology, which ultimately allows (1) dialogical determi-
nations with their clients (2) cooperation with other men-
tal health providers and (3) increasing their awareness to 
other forms of conceptualization of human strains17. The 
nature and the quality of the PCA therapeutic relation are 
not changed by theoretical erudition, as it is ontologically 
principled allowing for all epistemological frameworks. 
And also, some PCA-based therapies including Focusing, 
Emotion-based or Gestalt therapies require assessment to 
attain a degree of adequacy of their approaches18 20. 
Consequently neither (1) psychopathology ought to be re-
duced to a dictionary of symbols nor (2) PCA derides the 
theories (or symbols) included Psychiatry and Psychopa-
thology.
It’s own theory of psychopathology
Another link between PCA and psychopathology is its 
own theory of mental health and psychological distur-
bance13,21. Mental health in PCA is comprised by a (1) 
outstanding openness to the world, (2) an enduring and 
permanent clarity in the subjective appraisal of meaning 
of experiences (congruence) and (3) a self-concept that 
is self-acceptant is self-considerate. Psychopathological 
disturbance on the other hand is considered weathering 
incongruence which includes (1) experiences to which no 
meaning is attached to (e.g. despairing or feeling anxious 
for no apparent reason), (2) meanings and behaviours wi-
thout experiential features – detachment from experien-
ce as in depersonalization or involuntarily experiencing 
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that one is façade and (3) the inability to update negative 
behaviours and meanings – inability to leave interperso-
nal enslavement. Interestingly the process of psychologi-
cal healing is one that involves the achievement of person 
centred clarity (both symbolic and experiential) and so 
ultimately recovery allows interpersonal explanation of 
mental phenomena.
Cooperating with phenomenological psychopathology.
The fact that PCA shares many features with Phenome-
nological Psychopathology (PhP) method as both aim to 
unfold untouched personal experiences and meanings was 
already stressed. While in PCP this process is deemed the 
heart of therapy, in the PhP it is the foundation of the eide-
tic reduction necessary to adequately portray phenomena. 
The experiential/attitudinal features, the degree of rela-
tional depth, the non-interpretative methods of framing 
patient experience, the self-exploration of meanings and 
the permanent awareness of shared and non-shared expe-
riential landscapes in the encounter are ontological prin-
ciples that PCA shares with PhP. The possibility that PCA 
training might liaise with phenomenological psychopa-
thology training is what stands as the basis of this paper.
In what can the PCA help Psychopathologists?
Learning the phenomenological method through PCA
Various features of the PCA are shared with the pheno-
menological method. These include (1) actively aiming to 
collect phenomena through non-interpretative empathic 
understanding, (2) experientially focused dialogically at-
tuned reframing and reformulation and (3) “letting things 
be as they are” by unconditional positive regard. 
Non-interpretative empathic stance aims at understanding 
phenomena free from outward interpretations. It invol-
ves setting aside ideas, beliefs, expectations or previous 
understandings22. It aims to an unambiguous congruence 
between the experiential features occurring in the encoun-
ter. This dynamic listening of the client’s world to refor-
mulate what is central, critical, alive, or poignant accom-
panying the other sudden sense of insight. Reformulations 
should orchestrate rhythm and affect so that the structure 
of experience is unspoiled. The unconditional positive re-
gard empowers the entire exploration of the person’s way 
of being in the world. Overall the PCA aims to an active 
receptiveness to the Other’s otherness progressively more 
proficient in framing their experience in their meanings 
and the links between them.  
There is presently a thought-provoking discussion on 
Rogers’s idea of non-directivity as he seemed to suggest 
that one is educated in remaining close to person’s ex-
perience. If directivity has an overall agreement in PCA 
as guiding clients in the content of their speech apprai-
sing what is important, what is not and where to go and 
therefore constraining the exploration of experience21. 
But some PCA therapists consider that they actively ste-
er clients into the unfolding of their experiences rather 
than remaining at factual or abstract level (discussion on 
potential transgression of non-directivity23. Some ackno-
wledge even that the PCA paradigm isn’t non-directive 
but indeed experience-oriented24. Yet I believe that such 
expresses a paradoxical nature of non-directivity similar 
to the phenomenological epoché25. The overall tone PCA 
aims for neutralising previous biases (natural attitudes 
and value conditions) remaining at the right distance that 
allows the interviewer to be experientially moved whilst 
remaining separated from the patient. At the same time 
(1) an active effort to collect the experiential essence of 
each narrative but also letting things be for themselves 
(leghein) and (2) “attempt to leave their client’s way of 
placing their experience untouched by the therapist frame 
of reference. 
Learning Person-centred Structural Psychopathology 
with PCA
Person-Centred Structural Psychopathology proposes 
that psychopathological phenomena are not experiences 
or symbols but a network of experiences and symbols in 
which the links between the elements have meaning. The 
meaning of a phenomenon is structural – “an autonomous 
entity of internal dependencies”. Its autonomy means that 
adding external symbols (e.g. symbolic interpretations or 
genetic explanations) intrudes the phenomenon risking 
changing its symbolic nature. External symbols (e.g. me-
dical or psychoanalytical) are foreign connections that 
disturb the symbols and their structure. If psychopatho-
logical meanings are structural one must (1) avoid conta-
minating patients’ descriptions with any form of external 
reasons or causes and (2) but must not be satisfied by the 
assessment of simple experiences but, remaining in the 
person’s frame of reference, understand explanations and 
interpretations that the patient provides for himself. Such 
integration of different dimensions of meaning in context 
(pre-reflexive, reflexive and narrative) is the more basic 
unit of psychopathological assessment.
There is a similar idea in PCA coined frame of reference 
consisting of the person-centered structure of meanin-
gs and experiences. The therapist must remain within it 
whilst the patient explores and weaves his experiences. 
This requires refraining “from questioning, probing, bla-
me, interpretation, advice, suggestion, persuasion, reas-
surance”26 and also helping the other “explores his own 
attitudes and reactions more fully than he has previously 
done and will come to be aware of aspects of his attitudes 
which he has previously denied” 26. The attitude enforces 
in the awareness of such experiential structure, on the cla-
rity of the meanings that it involves as well as an increased 
possibility to share and reinvent the symbols they attach 
to them. Inadvertently the process of healing in the PCA 
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tradition (ultimately aiming to restore self-representation 
through an openness to experience) encourages both (1) 
paramount care for intact patients’ references and sym-
bols and (2) an in-depth exploration of experiential links 
of each of such symbols27. 
The interviewer with a PCA assesses by rearticulating the 
phenomena in the way they are being structured by the 
client frame of reference so that he can be the judge of the 
disturbances of such links (including major beliefs about 
oneself, one’s behaviour and the world). Such encourages 
the Other’s integration of experiences and inventiveness 
and unclutteredness of meanings (self-determination). 
Medical and psychological interviews are mostly bound 
to external symbols (medical, psychoanalytical etc) to ex-
plain and understand what is happening to their clients. 
If for PCP these carry nefarious implications in therapy 
they also seem taint the phenomena that ultimately must 
be portrayed and described.
Valuing Otherness through pCa
The concept of otherness has been discussed in philoso-
phy, sociology and psychology to communicate the diffe-
rence in the other in an encounter that cannot be redu-
cible or altogether explicable by one’s resources. There 
are some situations that involuntarily make us experience 
otherness in an encounter including (1) feeling that the 
other is not meaningful in a psychotic break or (2) not 
being able to understand by cultural or linguistic barriers. 
Yet in most clinical encounters the overall experience is of 
understanding – the possibility of encompassing the other 
in my own experiential realm and/or psychopathological 
symbols. Todays’ psychopathological assessment is there-
fore a translational effort of navigating the otherness and 
turning it into sameness28. But ineptness in dealing with 
otherness can lead to (1) misleading analogies (taking 
dissimilarity as similarity), (2) frustrating endeavours (ir-
ritation or annoyance by longstanding incomprehension) 
and (3) conveying to the patient a sentiment of isolation 
reification or detachment. Indeed a much forgotten featu-
re of otherness is that it involves an appreciation of their 
potential to reshape one’s world, to transform to varying 
degrees the possibilities they offer… The sense of …is 
not principally a matter of ignorance about the ingredients 
of their heads, it is a constituent of their personhood.”
29. Overall, in the process of assessing otherness the inter-
viewer should be able to keep ascertaining the otherness 
as valuable and irreducible28. 
Caring for otherness is very much at core of the PCA in-
cluding (1) ascertaining the other difference by upholding 
a reserve and avoiding analogies, (2) encouraging that the 
personal experiential meanings should rule over external 
conditions of worth and (3) supports “difference” also as 
ever-changingness in the “actualizing tendency”. First 
PCA advocates a precise experiential distance between 
the therapist and the client that allows a non-engulfing 
presence and acknowledges and respects the radical di-
fference of the person he finds (otherness). To develop a 
PCA one must first consolidate previous life experiences 
(which are helpful in other relations) and bracket them as 
they might hinder the empathic process by risk of analogy 
(correspondence to his own life). 
Second relational warmth, matured acceptance and res-
pect are expected, together, to trigger the person’s own 
resources in reclaiming and restructuring meanings. Be-
coming a PCA therapist involves developing a “structure 
of care” that is not felt by the person as coming from the 
outside (not coming from carers or supportive-egos) but 
from his own “inner capacities”. Such acceptance, safety 
and permissiveness also create an increasing sense of res-
ponsibility for such changes and decisions. In the process 
of creating such an environment therapists become avai-
lable for “being with their clients” in the sessions rather 
than contemplating and understanding their experiences. 
This attitudinal feature is of the utmost importance and 
qualitatively distinguishes different stages in training of 
therapists – established therapists are not only attuned but 
also actively engaged in their therapies (they are specta-
tors but players in therapies)
The third paradigm of PCA is that humans have “one 
basic tendency and striving - to actualize, maintain, and 
enhance the experiencing organism”30. In PCP persons are 
regarded as striving in a centrifugal movement in whi-
ch they reach towards novelty and enhancement. A PCA 
should trigger “within the client (…) constructive forces 
whose strength and uniformity have been either entirely 
unrecognized or grossly  underestimated”13. This idea 
matches contingency of psychopathological syndromes to 
the person’s active and permanent symbolization of expe-
riences and Mayer-Gross idea of “drive for the intelligible 
unity of life-construction” (Stanghellini citing Mayer-
-Gross31). Jaspers also provided a detail of the effort of 
humans to continuously strive through “their existential 
passivity towards an unknown meaning” (adapted from32).
Hampering of such internal drive can also be traced in 
the history of psychopathology, to alienists33 where per-
sons were still seen as remaining active in shaping their 
disorders and the constellation of symptoms. Moreover 
the feeling of being mentally ill entails a sense of having 
lost this “space of possibilities” as if the patient was cons-
tricted to a crystallised reality. Recovering the handiness 
self-awareness and the emergence of the actualizing ten-
dency34 commands the beginning of the symbolization 
(and some times re-symbolization) of life events which 
becomes progressively more private and esteemed. 
The aim for congruence readiness (Rogers in 35) to one’s 
experiential features would be interiorized by the person 
undergoing therapy, a step further in becoming a fully 
functioning person – the permanent awareness and res-
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pect to the experiential and existential features of our 
life36. But such experiential focus is relevant to psychopa-
thology, as disturbances of subjective experiencing could 
remain veiled by explanations. 
Intersubjective experience and meaning in the PCA
In psychopathology the objects of study are defined not 
only arising from the third and first person (subjective 
experience) viewpoints but also as disturbances of inter-
-subjective experience including (1) the way a person ex-
periences when in relation with others or (2) in certain set-
tings. The prominence and role of the encounter in PCA 
seems relevant for the attempt of enunciating it in phe-
nomenological terms. Rogers captures the encounter by 
saying that “every form of therapy more or less lives on 
the encounter between therapist and client … but there are 
not many theories which understand encounter . . . as the 
central source of healing and not as a subordinate one”37. 
Indeed most therapies rely on the therapeutic relation as 
instrumental mean to allow techniques in practice (CBT) 
or for interpretations. Rather in the PCA its importance is 
not as a mean but as an end – PCA therapeutic endeavour 
is the encounter 38. In other words empathy in PCA is not 
just relevant in therapy, the mean to an end as in other 
schools of psychotherapy, but the attitudinal centre of the 
therapeutic enterprise. 
The empathic structure in PCA includes also a balance 
between distance without detachment and closeness wi-
thout fusion or, as Roger asserted “being empathic, is to 
perceive the internal frame of reference of another with 
accuracy and with the emotional components and mea-
nings which pertain thereto as if one were the person, but 
without ever losing the ‘as if’ condition. Thus it means 
to sense the hurt or the pleasure (…) without ever losing 
the recognition that it is as if I were hurt or pleased and 
so forth. It is this ‘as if’ quality is lost, then the state is 
one of identification” 13. The importance of knowing the 
boundaries of my world and the other is fundamental for 
allowing the depiction of the three aspects (third, first and 
second person perspectives). Many other contributions, in 
particular by Bozarth and Greenberg have deepened such 
considerations on empathic efforts and accuracy in the 
PCA model39,18.
Buber claim that “all real life is encounter” 40 reinforce the 
importance of meaning that cannot be captured by narra-
tives and that meaning is dialogical – “the real dialogue…
comes from the existential centre of the person, it is not 
a question of information transfer, but of participating 
in and sharing the being of the other” (Rogers cited by 
21). Relational depth is not a mean to allow the enfolding 
of first and third person meaning but carries meaning it-
self. Rogers extensively supported the idea that knowing 
the other is primordially the interpersonal attendance of 
a fully congruent individual. By allowing them to fully 
exist in the encounter the therapist or the psychopatho-
logist can aim at assessing their way-of-being. Empathy 
in PCA seems relevant for the phenomenological descrip-
tion of the interpersonal features, as they will be available 
for portrayal in an intact way. The next section includes a 
critical appraisal of how empathic understanding in PCA 
is attuned with the heterology stance about empathy that 
was deemed relevant for the psychopathological enqui-
re28.
PCA, Aesthetics and Atmospheres
This is different from the way that the present psychopa-
thological exam is being taught. Following the current me-
dical trend, we endorse as a prescriptive approach to the 
psychopathological examination that is active and where 
the psychiatrist should externally contemplate or descri-
be experiences and select, depict and analyse content. He 
should then integrate it into an epistemological structu-
re, ultimately an analytic-synthetic scrutiny according 
to strict external symbols and norms. Yet as psychiatrist 
don’t develop a “passive momentum” they risk hindering 
their attention to a large dimension of meanings (dialogi-
cal), to limit the availability of symbols outside of their 
framework, to fracture narratives and to remain an active 
intervenient in the symbolization. Cristina Costa argues 
that it is important to recover an “aesthetic attitude” mea-
ning “as if one was attending art”41. In such moments one 
is passive and is moved by the experiential features of the 
moment – he actively lets go of prejudiced ideas and pre-
disposes to wonder. There the person assesses subjective 
and intersubjective phenomena that would otherwise be 
elusive41. Such is very similar to the PCA attitude and tho-
se skills are particularly present in the PCA training. First 
they need to let go of prejudices and pre-arranged unders-
tandings and allow a non-directive flow of the narrative 
(and phenomena) being shared in the encounter. Also they 
are focused on the atmospheric appreciation of themsel-
ves in the relation but more specifically the setting and the 
person they are encountering. Rogers discussed the idea 
of presence and the relevance of the immediacy of “mo-
ment-to-moment encounter of psychotherapy” (Rogers in 
35) The PCA training includes (1) therapists developing an 
interpersonal thoughtfulness that increases intimacy and 
closeness; (2) aesthetic appreciation of their clients’ expe-
riential field. The first is found in Mearns portrayal of one 
such appreciation “I could see her there, but I couldn’t say 
anything. I wanted to tell her that I could see her there, but 
I couldn’t tell her – it was scary – maybe it was like having 
a stroke and being paralyzed so that I could feel her but 
I couldn’t tell her. She must have understood me, becau-
se she never asked me any questions – you can’t answer 
people’s questions when you are like that. She would say 
some things – things which went along with what was 
going on in me, things like ... well, I don’t remember any 
particular things – but I do know that she was close – she 
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was close inside me.”17. This idea is particularly present 
in Pre-therapy for psychosis (Van Werde in 42) includes in 
the most disengaged relationships “restoring, strengthe-
ning and sustaining contact” 35. The second is found in the 
use of reformulations centred in aesthetic features extant 
in the encounter conveying back to their clients if the at-
mosphere is tense, edgy, joyful or insecure. 
Conclusion
Today, psychopathology sees the revitalization of the re-
levance (1) of first-person (subjective symbolization) and 
second-person perspectives (inter-subjective features to 
meaning) and (2) of maintaining the dialogical structure 
of relation and interview. For long now clinical diagno-
sis and empirical research (in particular neurolocalizatio-
nism) have disregarded such mind-sets. This is said to be 
damaging the relation between the phenomena that lived 
and those that are measured and through this damaging 
the validity of current categories (and research). Indeed, 
psychiatric and psychological training despite being re-
markably focused on research, do not comprise (1) trai-
ning in relational features or (2) understanding how sub-
jectivity can be assessed. On the contrary they are largely 
focused on keeping within the standards of objectification 
and primarily concentrated in nosology. This essay re-
views aptitudes such as the relational skills and depth and 
other attitudes that could allow us a larger range of asses-
sed phenomena. Moreover it stresses how these features 
are attitudinal in nature and so unapproachable by reading 
or theoretical lessons.
Also it was implied that training in Person Centred Appro-
ach might help mental health providers and researchers 
in these efforts by (1) reducing cognitive interpretations 
and empathy by analogy; (2) attaining a facilitative warm, 
receptive and positive regard considering stimulating in-
terpersonal exploration of meanings;  (3) increasing the 
focus on experiential features of meaning; (4) acquiring 
an heterology stance by maintaining both congruency and 
emotional awareness and particularising the otherness (re-
garding alterity) throughout the encounter and (5) increa-
sing presence and possibly an aesthetic attitude that could 
reveal significant personal and interpersonal features. Ac-
quiring skills in PCA in future psychiatric programmes, 
might improve the range and the validity of psychopa-
thological meanings accessed for diagnosis and research.
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